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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
TIH~ STATE OF UTAH 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
llERHERrr1 LEE SHONDEL, 
Def end a nt-Apve ll ant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANrr1 
Case No. 
11287 
S'l1 A rr1El\rENT OF NA rrrRE OF CASE 
,\p1wllant, lll>rlwrt Let> Shond('l, a1>peals from a 
l'i;1<Lng of guilty of vossPssion of LSD and the sentence 
jrnpo:wd tlH'reon in Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Coimt_\·, Stat(~ of Utah. 
DISPOSITION" I~ LUWER COURT 
( )n F<'hrnary 2G, 19G8, def1::'ndant, Herbert Lee Shon-
llc•l, follo\Ying a d<'nial of his motion to quash admitted 
11i:~ possl'ssion of LSD as charged in the information, 
:ind t1H' com·t fonnd him guilty of the offense charged; 
\111n('t:p011, th(' conrt s<'nt<'ncPd Mr. Shondel to the Utah 
;i.1i1· l'ri~,011 for the frlon_\· offrm:p allPged against him. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a dismissal of his conviction of pm:-
session of LSD and a setting aside of the sentencr im-
posed. Alternatively, defendant seeks to have the sm-
trnce reduced to a misdemeanor as provided in Utah\; 
Drng Abuse Law. 
STATEMENT OF FACrrS 
Defendant, H<>rbert Lee ShondPl, was chargrd h,\· 
way of information with pos:wssion of a narcotic drng·, 
to-·wit: Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in violation 
of ~58-13a-2 U tali Code Ann. ( 1953) : such act ·was all<·g<'d 
to ]iavc> occnrPd on or about OctohPr G, mm. (ri1-1'.2) 
Lysergic acid or LSD was i11corpartcd into U tal1 's 
narcotic law by the 1967 Legislature under ~58-13a-1 ( 15) 
and d0fined as a narcotic drug hy paragraph (lG) of 
the same section. lTnder ~58-13a-2 Utah Codl' Ann. 
(1953), possession of LSD thus lwcame a felon:T off<•JlS(' 
·within the narcotic la\YS of Utah. ~5S-Ula-"14 lTtah Cnlk 
Ann. (as enacted 1957). Ilm\'<'Y<T, in th<' ~;am<> session 
of tlw 19G7 Lrgislatnn•, LSD \\'n.s declared to he a "dP-
pressant or stimnlant clrng [·~5~-33-1 (d) (:3), UtPll 
Code Ann. (as 0nacted rnm)l, and po;.;s<·~:~~ion ol' L~·~D 
was deelared 1111 law fol [ ~;s~~-:J:J-'.2 ( e) 1 · t;._h Cod<> , \ mL 
(as enacted 10(i7)] ancl a rni;.;d<·nw<11·.or ll\ ~s:~-:l:1-4(a) ol 
th<> same ad. 
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Due to the seeming inconsistencv between the two 
ads, n-•lating to the control of LSD, counsel for the de-
frndant made a motion to qnash or alternative motion 
to r<'<l11c<' the charge to a misdemeanor and argued the 
:c;:mw lwfon~ the Honorahle l\Iarcellns K. Snow, Judge, 
Third District Court, Rtate of Utah on February 26, 
1968. Following a denial of connsrl's motion (T-37) the 
collrt infonm•d Mr. Shondd lw was pleading to tlw 
i'<•lony offrnse of possession of a naroctic drug. (T-37) 
For th<' pnrpose of rm•fwning his right of appeal, Mr. 
:-;Jiornl<•l admitt<'d to lwing in possPssion of LSD and tlw 
r·n11rt found defendant guilt)- of the rrinw as chargc•d in 
tl1r> i11forrnation. (rC-40) AftPr waiYing time for sentenc-
ing· <ld<>ndant was rommittefl to th<' Utal; State Prison 
for tlw offensP invohTed. ('T'-18, '1'-40). 
_;\]thong·li ('Olll1~wl also rais<•d tl1e <pwstion of cl<•-
1' lHbnt 's rip;lit to a speed:·< trial, '.;1wh i~-·s11P is nmY lw-
li<·wd to hP '.Yitlwnt rnurit, and only the ~:tatntor)T cpws-
tion n•lating to LSD is raised here. See Jloorc v. Turner 
-t;'.2 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim. 1967). 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH IN THAT THE 
LAWS OF UT AH RELATING TO POSSESSION OF 
LSD ARE UNCONSITUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION DUE TO THE EXISTENCE 
OF SEPAK:\TG STATUTES WHICH PROSCRIBE 
IDENTICAL CONDUCT YET PROYIDE FOR SEP-
ARATE PUNI~nil1.IENTS. 
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Under Utah law possession of Lysergic Acid Di-
ethylamide (LSD) constitutes a violation of §58-13a-2 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), and a felony by the terms of 
§58-13a-44 Utah Code Ann. (as enacted 1957). Lysergic 
Acid or LSD vrns declared a narcotic drug in 1967 by 
the Utah State Legislature by amendment. §58-13a-l 
(1G). However, in 1967 the Utah Legislatnre also enacted 
the Drug Abuse Control Law, being Section 58, Chapter 
33. By the terms of §58-33-l(d) (3) LSD is declared a 
"depressant or stimulant drug" and under §58-33-2 ( c) 
and §58-33-6 ( c), it is made unlawful for a person tc 
possess any depressant or stimulant drug; such posses-
sion for a first offender constitutes a misdem<'anor und('r 
§58-33--1-. To allow 10gislation to exist wherein one 11iaY 
, be punished by different degre(~S for the sanw act is a 
denial of equal protection and therefore unconstitutional. 
Olsen v. DPlmore, 295 P.2d 324 (\:Vash. 1956); State r. 
Pirkry, 281 P.2d 698 (Ore. 1955). 
A side by side examination of the possession lmrs 
of Utah relating to LSD under the Uniform Narcotic 
Act (Section 58 Chapter 13a) and the Drug Abuse Lmr 
will evidence• that with respect ~o Lf!D ~Ctah has bro 
statutes covering the same snhject matter, yet eaeh pro-
viding for a diffrrent penalty. 
UNIFORM NARCOTIC 
DRUG ACT 
~58-13a-1 (16) (as amended 
19G7) "Narcotic drugs" means 
... LSD-25, and every sub-
stance neither chemically nor 
physically distinguishable 
from them. 
s58-13a-2. It shall be un-
lawful for any person to ... 
possess ... any narcotic drug, 
except as authorized in this 
act. 
§G8-13a-44 (as enacted 
l~l37) ... Any person violat-
ing any other provision [in-
cluding- 58-13a-2] of this chap-
ter, shall, upon conviction be 
punished for the first offense 
by a fine of not less than 
$1,000 or by imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison for not 
~xceeding five years, or by 
both such fine and imprison-
ment ... (Item in brackets is 
by petitioner). 
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DRUG ABUSE 
CONTROL LAW 
§58 - 33 - l(d) (as enacted 
1967) The term "depressant 
or stimulant drug" means: 
( 3) Any drug or derivative 
containing any quantity of 
d-Lysergic acid diethylamide 
commonly known as L.S.D. 
§58-33-2. The following 
acts and the causing thereof 
are hereby prohibited: ( c) 
The possession ... of drugs 
in violation of section 58-33-
6 ( c) ... 
§58-33-6(c) No person, 
other than a person describ-
ed in subsection (a) or sub-
section (b) (2) shall posses 
any depressant or stimulant 
drug ... 
§58-33-4(a) Any person 
who violates any of the provi-
sions of section 58-33-2 shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and shall on conviction thereof 
be subject to imprisonment 
for not more than one year 
or a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars or both such 
imprisonment and fine ... 
rrlie above comparison shows definitely that Utah 
hns two separate statutes proscribing the identical sub-
]«'d rnattt'l', to-·wit: vossc•ssion of LRD; yet each statute 
<1111l1oriz<>s a separatt' and distinrt punishment. 
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In State v. Pirkey, supra, defendant was charged 
with writing insufficient fnnds checks contrary to Oregon 
Law. The statute in question made knowingly issuing 
an insufficient funds check a crime; howe,-er, either a 
grand jury or a magistrate had the discretion to pro-
ceed against the accused by way of a misdemeanor or a 
felony. The Supreme Court of Or0gon in affirming a 
dismissal by th0 lower court held the statute unconstitu-
tional as violative of equal protection guaranteed through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. rrhe basis of the decision 
·was that the statutes prescribed difforent degn•es of 
punishment for the same act without specif~-ing any 
recognizable standard to determine which punishment 
shonld he im-okNl. 
Pirkry has heen limited hy Rose 1:. Gladd 11, ,~0.) 
P.2d 453 (Ore. 1965) to the sitnation wlwre sPparafr 
offenses were provided in the same statute without any 
reasonable basis for distinguishing the situation to whieh 
either offense would be applicable. Such limitation, 
however, does not affect defendant's position in tlrnt 
it is believed that as between the provisions of 5S-3:l 
and 58-13a, the crime of possession of LSD is precisely 
the same in each instance and the punishments an~ dif-
f(-'l'ent. Furth0r, since this court is not hound by Pirkl'.lf 
supra, it is, likewise not bound h>- the limitation plae<·d 
upon Pirkry h>- Gladden, supra. 
Defrndant proce<'dvd h>- wa>- of 1nit of lla1was eor]Hl~ 
rn Olsrn ·v. Dr!morr, su1;rn, all<'g·:n.'--': his r<•:traint in tlw 
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\rash ington penitentiary was illegal in that his convic-
1 ion nnder a statute prohibiting the unlawful possession 
of a firearm was unconstitutional. The basis of the alle-
L·ation was that the statute prescrilwd two degrees of 
pllnislmwnt for the same offrnsP, to-wit: $500 fine or 
one year in the county jail, or both, or one to ten years 
in the stat0 penitentiary. Finding the statute unconstitu-
tional under the FonrtPPnth AmendmPnt as 1\rpll as ~Wash­
mgton's own equal protection clause> (Art. 1 ~12 \Vash. 
Const.), the court held: 
... that a statute which purports to autl10riz<' ( 
prmwcnting officials to charge violations of a sc>c-
tion of the penal code eitlwr as a gross misdr-
rneanor or a felon:-r constitutes a d(1nial of equal f 
protrction under thr law. See State v. Boggs, 358 
P.~?(l 124 at 128 (\Vash. 19G1) (aserihing such 
l1n!(1ing to ()[sen, s11;1ru.). 
D<·l"emlant in the instant casP is not unaware of thr 
faet tliat thP two casrs cited ahoYe arP distinguishahlP 
frnrn his own in that Pirkey and OlsPn both involYed a 
single statute prescribing different punishments, wherPas 
in tlw instant case two separate statutes are involv0d. 
Howp1rer, the fact that two separate statutes prescribe 
differen punishments would not he a reasonable basis to 
distinguish the above cases, whPn the same problem of 
rrprnl protection exists, i.e., granting to a prosecutor, at 
his wltim, the right to proceed against a defendant by 
fl lllisd< 1nwanor or a folonv for thr same act. Olsrn ii. 
. f7f 
f},/uwre, supra; Cf. State 1'. Cnrmr111. 140 P.G70 (Utah 
l ! }l ! ) 
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In State v. Cannan, s11pra, the Supreme Court of 
Utah declared that an enactment of a misdemeanor law 
prohibiting sale of liquor to Indians, impliedly repealPd 
a statute making the same act a felony, in that the mi~-
. demeanor law was the most recent expression of the legi8-
lature. Hmvever, the basis for this decision was the sanw 
as in Olsen and Pirkey s11pra; that is, the Utah Supreme 
Court found it to be contrary to Legislative intent and 
sound policy; 
\ 
/ 
. . . that two laws upon the same snhjert 
should be enforced, under whieh a vPndor eould 
he sent to the state prison for a frlon)·, while 
nnder the other he conld he eonvict(•<l of a mi~­
demeanor rnerPly, and wlwther he ·was to n'cei\'r> 
the greater or lesser punishment h(' made de1wnrl-
ant npon the whim of a prosrcuting officer. Stu! 
v. Carmon, s11pra, at 671. 
One case which may appear in opposition to dt>fend-
ant's position is that of State v. Reid, 401 P.2d 9SS 
(Wash. 1965). Reid involved two separate statutes, each 
of ·which involved possession of narcotics, hut prescrilwd 
separate punishments, to-wit: a misdemeanor and a 
felony. Although the Supreme Court fonnd hoth statute~ 
eonstitutional, the case is obviously distingnislrnhle frorn 
the instant case in that the misdemeanor statute ma(k 
usr of narcotics a crime and possession of a rnucotie 
under the statute was prima farie <>Yifll'JlC(' of an int<·nl 
to illegally use a narcotic. On tlw otli<>r l1and tlw i'<·lo11\· 
statutf> madP possession of nareoti"s al01w a crirrn•. '1'1 1 ' 
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conrt found a reasonable basis for each statnte, and 
distinguished Pirkey and Olsrn, in that one who was 
l1:-:ing drugs was not so dangerons as one in possession, 
wl10 could dispense to anotlwr. 
F1Jon the anthorities cited, defendant contends that 
the laws of rtah making possession of LSD a crime are 
n11eonstitnticmal:J.1s; a denial of eqnal protection for the 
rrasons herein:~tated, ·In making such allegation counsel 
d(JPS not disregard provision (g) of 58-33-6 Utah Codn 
Ann. (as rnacted 1967) which reads: 
N othwithstanding the other provision of this 
act, whenever the possE'ssion, sale, transfer, or 
dispensing of any drug or substance would con-
stitute an offense under this act and also con-
stitntPs an offense under the laws of this state 
re' la ting to the possession, sale, transfer or dis-
p<'nsing of narcotic drugs or marijuana, such of-
frnse shall not be punishable nnder this act but 
shall be punishabel under snch other provision of 
law. 
However, under the recent decision of State v. Rasmus-
sen, ts Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966) wherein the 
eonrt held §77-1-8 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1953), which 
~ta ted an incarcerated defendant " ... shall be entitled 
ti) a trinl within thirtv daYs aft<>r arraignment ... ," to 
hr• (lirrdonT and not mandatory, the language of provi-
:;ion ( µ:) of 58-::l~-(; might likc>wise he directory. There-
l'11r<\ a prosecutor could, at his whim, still determine to 
') 
I 
\ 
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prosecute an offender as a folon or a misdemenant for 
the single act of possession of LSD and the problem 
of equal protection in Utah's law governing I_.jSD still 
exists. State v. Pirkey, supra; See Stnte 1.:. Carman, 
.q1pra. 
Defendant, therefore, contends that the existence of 
two statutes proscribing the same cohduct, to-wit: posses-
sion of LSD, yet prescribing different punishments is 
violative of equal protection (Pirkey and Olsen, supra) 
and, therefore, the laws are unconstitutional, in that tlw 
laws of Utah as set out above grant to a prosecutor tl1!' 
right to proceed against an accused for a misdenwanor 
or a felony, all at the whim of the prosrcutor. Sncl1 a 
situation is contrary to sonnd legal policy. Cf. State r. 
Cnrnw11, supra. \Yherefore, defendant contends t1::1t tlw 
matter should be dismissed, or in the alternative that tlli' 
situation should be remedied in favor of the defendant. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST TO CON-
STRUE THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF LSD 
TO BE A MISDEMEANOR IN THAT THE LATEST 
EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE RELATING 
TO SUCH OFFENSE l\IADE THE SAl\lE A MIS-
DEMEANOR AND SUCH LEGISLATIVE EXPRES-
SION REPEALED BY Il\IPLICATION THE FELONY 
LAW RELATING TO POSSESSION OF LSD. 
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1t is recognized that where two enactments of the 
I( gislative hranch are plainly inconsistent and irrecon-
('ilahle tlw latest expression of the legislature takes pre-
r1·dP11eP o\-er the former, [Thiokol Chemical Corporation 
1. Pefl'rson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391 (1964)], and 
tlw latter will, by implication, repeal the former. State 
i'. Carman, 140 P. 670 (Utah 1914). Such a rule of law 
i~ ('qually applicable in the situation where hvo acts, 
(·nactPd at the same session of a legislature, are incon-
sisknt or repugnant to each other; in such a case the 
net last in sequence of the opposing legislatiw Pnact-
uwnts is presumed to be the last in time and prevails 
OYPI' that which is first in sequence. State v. 111 ontiel, 
GG J\'".:M. 181, 241 P.2d 844 (1952). Although repeal by 
implication is not favored, [Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 
4~9, 304 P .2d 380 ( 1956)], and especially when two stat-
11tes are passed at the same legislative session [In re 
Lewis' Adoption, 380 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1963)], such repeal 
is, nevertheless, necessary when the statutes cannot be 
rrconciled. Thiokol Chcrnical Corporation v. Peterson, 
s111Jra; State v. M ont£?il s11pra. Because possession of 
um was made a misdemeanor offense subsequent to its 
lwing made a felony (See Laws of Utah 1967, Chapter 
1+0 and 139 respectively), the latter law takes precedence 
oVPr the former and is the controlling law in Ptah. 
,cfate 1c. JJ!ontirl, s11prn. 
Sf((f(' 1., Jlonticl, s11prn, reversed an indecent expo-
~111·p and indecPnt handling of a female minor conviction 
rlf the' d<>l<'ndant on grounds that the legislature at the 
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same session had fixed two distinct terms of court, and 
defendant was tried in the term fixed bv the first art 
" ' 
which had been repealed by the second act. Due to tlw 
enactment of the two acts on the same subject, and tlw 
implied reepal of the former, the con rt held defendant 
was tried in a term not authorized by law. In State v. 
Carman supra, the Utah 8upr0me Conrt upheld a con-
viction of defendant for selling liq nor to an Indian; how-
ever, his felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor 
in that the court found two statues to exist on tlw saiiw 
snbject, to-wit: selling liquor to an Indian; and tlH1 
misdemeanor law being latter in time impliedly repeal<)d 
the former f(,lonv statnh>. At 672 the ronrt stat<'d: 
\\Te hav0 also repeat<'dl~- Jwld that, whilr re-
1wals hy implication are not fayorrd by the rrrnrts, 
~-et, ,d1Pn' thP lafrr prm·isions upon a giv('Jl sitli-
ject are clearly and manifestly repugnant to ('Xist-
ing provisions, the later ones control, and, so far 
as they are repugnant to the earlier provisiom;, 
the earlier ones must be deemed to be repealed h>' 
implication. . . . We think the case at bar clearly 
falls wW1in the doctrin<~ there announced. 
Because the provisions of !'58-13a-2 and 58-33-2, under 
their respective acts, both make possession of LSD a 
criminal offense, but punishable by separatee penaltirs, 
the two are repugnant and inconsistent. State v. Carmall, 
supra. According to Laws of Ftah 19()7, LSD was tennt>cl 
a narcotic drng by Chapt0r 139 and was pm;sed hy tlw 
legislature }\larch 2, 19G7. On the other haHd h~- Chapter 
140, LRD was declared to hP a "dPpressa11t or stirnnlniil 
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drng" on March 9, 19G7; however, each act became effec-
tin' May 9, 19G7. Therefore, follffwing the statutory con-
;;irnction rule of Monteil, s11prn and Cannan, supra, 
C'!iaptt>r 33 of Title 58, Ftah Code Ann. insofar as it 
relates to the offense of possession of LSD, being the 
the last expression of the lc>gislatnre, impliedly repeals 
those provisions of Chapter 13a of rritle 58 Utah Code 
,\nn., insofar as they relate to the identical suhjrct 
matter. Consequently defendant in thf' instant casr 
;.;]1onld he re-sentencPd und<•r ~58-33--i (a). 
In drawing the above conclusion counsel is not un-
mindful of the fact that provision (g) of 58-33-6 asserts 
that ·when possession of a drng would be an offense 
m1der both the Drng Abuse Lm\T and under the Narcotic 
,\ct, the act should be punishable under the narcotic laws 
nf Utah. However, in construing statutes, whenever pos-
sihl<', tlw conrt should give f'ffect to eyery part of an 
art, [Totorica v. Thomas, 1G Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 
( 1 D5G)], including 0very word, clause and sentence of a 
lPgislative enactment. Maw v. Lee, 157 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1~45). In order to give rff ect to every provision of the 
1%7 Utah Drug Abuse La-w, thf' court mnst declare pos-
S<•ssion of LSD nnder 58-33-2(c) to he a misdemeanor by 
i"JK<t3-4(a) of that act. Hmn•ver, 58-33-G(g), if followPd, 
J (•ndt>rs t1H' portions of the Drng Abuse Law relating 
!rJ posst>ssion of LSD ·withont effect; yet the Drng Abuse 
1.nw with rrspPct to LRD is tlH.' last expression of the 
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Jegislature and should be controlling over the Narcotic 
Law, if such provisions of the Drug Ahnse Law relating 
to LSD are to have effect. 
Because the Drug Abuse Act is the latter enactment 
of the legislature as opposed to the LSD provision under 
the narcotic act, the court belffw, in passing s0ntence upon 
the defendant, should have imposed sentence under ~58-
33-4( a) Utah Code Ann. (as ("nacted 19G7) rather than 
nndrr ~58-13a-44 Utah Code Ann. (as enact0d 1%7). 
State v. Carnurn, supra. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RE-
DUCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
TO A MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION IN THAT THE 
CONFLICT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE FEL-
ONY AND MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES OF POS-
SESSION OF LSD SHOULD HAVE BEEN RE-
SOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LEAST HARSH PEN-
ALTY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LENITY. 
Undt•r the rnle of lenity ·where a criminal statute 
lends itself to more than one interpretation and neithrr 
the statute nor its legislative history lend itself to a dPf-
inite meaning, a construction adopting tltC> less lwr:-;h 
application to the accused is favored. f,((i/ller 10. l'J1if,·J 
States, 358 U.S. 1G9 (1958): Prince 1·. U11if!'d States, :l;l~ 
U.R. ~22 (1957): Rell v. United 8tofr'.c;, ;~+0 P.f~. ~~1 (1q;):il 
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Tltr rule of lenity has been applied to merge separate 
offensPs into a single crime, (Bell v. United States, 
_,11;1rn), or cause an act injuring two victims to be but a 
:'inp,'le offense. Ladner v. United States, supra. It is con-
tuncle<l that lenity should equally apply to the instant 
situation, where two statutes express separate punish-
nwnt for the same offense, and the less harsh punishment 
f:l1onlcl lle adopted favorahlP to the defendant. 
In the Lad11rr casr, su1;ra, thP Supreme Court of thr 
['11it<>d Stat(_•s considered the qnestion whether the firing 
of a single shot, ·which injured two federal officers, con-
t'iitnted a single assault offense or separate offenses for 
11·hich separate sentences could be imposed. In reversing 
111(• affirmative answer of the intermediate appellate 
eomt thP Rnprt>me Court applied the doctrine of lenity, 
11la('ing the less harsh construction on the assault statute 
in qut•stion, ruling that hnt one offense -vrns committed; 
how<>ver, the matter was remanded to detrrmine whether 
d(•fenclant had fired more than one shot. To support 
its position the United States Supreme Court asserted 
tliat lenity should be applied to adopt a less harsh inter-
J1rPtation of a statute where Congress had failed to give 
a definit<~ meaning or a statute is subject to ambiguity. 
At 178 thr court stated: 
'l'his polir\· of lenit:· means that the Court 
will 11ot inteqn·<>t a foclc>ral niminal statute so as 
to iner<'rn~(' the JH'nalt~· that it plaC'es on an indi-
\'i<hrnl wl1<'11 snrl1 nn interpretation ean he based 
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on no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended. 
In Prince, sitprn, lenity was applied to merge tlw 
offense of entering a bank with intent to rob into tlw 
offense of robbery, thus allowing but a single offense. 
Rell, supra, applied the rnle to the transportation of 
two women on the same trip in violation of the statute 
n•lating to transportation for prostitution purposes and 
fonnd but a single offense. In Harris v. Unit<'d 8tatrs, 
;~59 U.S. 19, r<'h den., 359 U.S. mG (1959) the court n·-
fnsed to apply the doctrine of lenity to the offenses of ' 
imrchasing heroine from an unstamped package and re-
ceiving and concealing the same knffwing it to have 1wrn 
1mlawfully imported. Petitioner argued that 1wcaus(' ~i 
single act of possession raised presmnptions for ho~]i 
crimes, consecutive s~'ntences, which had been impoc~l'd 
upon him, were improper. However, the conrt recognizl'(l 
that because Congress, by numerous narcotic statute;;, 
evidenced an intent to deal more severely -Yvith the nar-
cotic problem, a policy of severity rather than lenity was 
adopted. Nevertheless, the court also explained that tlw , 
two offenses were distinctly different as to proof. 
In the instant case the Utah statutes relating to 
possession of LSD cover the precise same elements ~-ct 
provide separate punishrrn'nts. Th0 legislature, Pxcept 
as stated in provision (g) of 53_;3;~-Ci, ha~; evidenr<>d :t 
trend toward lenity in the> pos~wssion of LSD in il1;1i 
snch possession ,,-as madt• a misdt>mc·nnor ~'.nh:c:ciq1wnt 1•· 
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it~ ]wing made a felony. Furthrr, because the Drng 
,\ h11sr' Law was encated after possrssion of LSD ·was 
i:1nde a frlony (see Argnm0nt II, supra) at best an 
e1:11higuity arises as to what the Utah Legislature really 
i11h·nded to do with LSD. Therefore, under the doctrine 
of lenity as announced by the Snpreme Court of the 
Unitrd Stat0s in Lander, suprn, the indefiniteness and 
alllhignit,\' caused by the Utah Legislature under the hrn 
,,tPatntes in question should be resofred in favor of the 
dPfrmlant - the sentence should be made a misdemeanor 
as rrrp1irrd by ~58-33-4 (a) 1Ttah Code Ann. (as enact0rl 
1 ~G7). 
CONCLUSTON 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully contended 
that the matter against defendant should he quashed, or 
al1emati\'ely reduced to comply with ~5S-33-4(a) Utah 
f1rlrk• Ann. (as en ca ted 19G7). 
Respectfully submitted, 
.TAY V. BARNEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
